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error; but this seems inconsistent, since he is sometimes inclined to give up the objectivity even of truth (which no doubt is a sacrifice demanded by the method that tries to base knowledge on "particulars"). Indeed, his position appears peculiarly unsatisfactory, being precisely that Naturalism against which Mr. Balfour has argued, in all its instability and inevitable incoherence. Mr. Cecil has not, as far as I can see, by any means estimated the force either of the special argument against Naturalism or of the whole contention as to the foundations of science of which it is a part, and, in fact, believes himself to be still impregnable in that hopelessly ruined "fortress."

And he derides the argument from needs, and by a question-begging use of epithets presents the ever-renewed struggle in thought and practice as a contest between "Science" and "Religion," as a crude opposition of two forces, of which the one is always rational, and the other irrational, hypocritical, prejudiced, and violent; whereas, the truth is rather that the fight all along the line has been between different claimants to reason, different stages of Thought and Feeling,—a struggle that goes on also within the borders of Science itself, and within the very sanctuaries of Religion.

Mr. Kidd may have failed in his reading of "Evolution;" Mr. Drummond's attempt to interfuse the selfish struggle for existence with love and self-sacrifice and to transform the apparent evil of the world to good may have broken down; Mr. Balfour may have been less successful in championing orthodox Christianity than in exhibiting the necessary dependence of Science on Metaphysics; but they have at least done much, and in a reverent spirit, to rouse men's minds to intelligent interest in the great questions which concern the relation of Fact to Philosophy, of what *is* to what *ought* to be, of Man to Nature and to God.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE MORAL SELF. By B. Bosanquet. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. viii., 132.

It may be gathered from internal evidence that this little book was first produced in the form of University Extension Lectures, like the author's previous "Essentials of Logic;" and it is no small distinction of that movement that, partly, perhaps, from the greater mental maturity of the audience than obtains in regular

universities, it should have provoked two such text-books. Less successful than the earlier book, because it is less of one piece, and serves as a kind of introduction to several psychological works, this book has certainly one merit of a text-book, that of stimulating thought and whetting the reader's appetite to learn more of the subject from some of the larger works. But it is exceedingly brief, and lacking in illustration, and it will need ample commentary in some of its harder parts which are brief even to obscurity. The plan of the book is as follows: First comes an account of the nature of psychology as dealing with one aspect of all experience, then a general description of the nature of psychical events. After these preliminaries follow: a sketch of how we are conscious of things (the least lucid part of the book) and how our knowledge becomes organized (one of the best parts); a psychology of self-consciousness as opposed to consciousness of things; and in succession chapters on feeling, on volition and certain problems arising in connection therewith, on reasonable action, and, finally, on the relation of body and soul. It will be seen that a great deal of ground is covered. The frequent references to different writers, while they add to the usefulness of the book for the inquirer, give an impression of disconnectedness; but there is a definite thread of continuity. In describing the general nature of mind and the growth of cognition, Mr. Bosanquet expounds with much effectiveness the singleness or organic character or continuity of mind, which was magisterially formulated by Dr. Ward; and it is doubtless this same principle of organization by "identity of contents" as opposed to atomism and association which makes him insist later on that the moral ideal is not a question of egoism and altruism, but a question of who I am and others are; that the moral self is "the realization of a certain nature which is the outcome" of persons working together in society (p. 94 adapted). It must be confessed that in the crusade against the wickedness of atomism and associationism Mr. Bosanquet (with others) goes far towards putting mental processes out of the way as much as the associationists put "identity of content" out of the way. How do the logical "universals" which association is said to marry, get married? And how do we settle what sort of persons we include in our moral purview except by the action of these several persons enforcing their claims?

In so condensed a book, representing so much thinking and in so individual a form, many points call for remark, of which very

few can be mentioned. In dealing with self-consciousness, it is suggested that successful self-assertion against objects may be its first germ, and later on, in Chapter VIII., when the question is raised whether society is necessary to the genesis of a moral self, the germ of moral feeling is found in the contrast of success and failure in the individual. This is a very interesting point, but Mr. Bosanquet seems not to press it, and to allow that neither self-consciousness nor the moral judgment arise practically without experience of the "we." He illustrates from Hegel, and adds this fine saying of his own: "If we compare self-consciousness in the bad sense (with the good sense of the term), we find that the term is used when the self is indeed aware of itself but cannot count upon a positive place, upon that definite recognition which constitutes its reality." His account of volition follows Professor James on the whole; accordingly, he does not admit the necessary antecedence of desire, comparing decision to the solution of a problem rather than a process which results from feeling. Abandoning psychology for a moment, he raises the question whether the moral self may include non-social elements (such as art or truth), and he concludes that "all the great contents of developed human self—truth, beauty, religion, and social morality—are all of them but modes of expression of the ideal self;" an elusive answer, it may well seem (though illustrated finely from Plato), since we learn neither what the ideal self means, nor how its different modes of expression are related to each other. On the question of reasonable action, Mr. Bosanquet, in pursuance of his principle, finds reasonableness in "self-consistency," or "consistency with the whole of experience," a position which he reaches by criticism of Hume, Kant, and Professor Sidgwick. The discussion of altruism is very interesting, and still more the brief section on self-assertion and self-sacrifice. The reader wishes for much more, but perhaps this is the merit of the book that the tabloids of nutriment it supplies leave us with the desire of a further less condensed and more epicurean meal.

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THE WILL TO BELIEVE, AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY. By William James. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897. Pp. xvii., 332.

Professor James is by common consent in the forefront of his science, and one may with some confidence regard this volume as